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Abstract
This paper proposes a simple model for understanding transaction
costs – their composition, size and policy implications. We distinguish
between investments in institutions that facilitate exchange and the
cost of conducting exchange itself. Institutional quality and market
size are determined by the decisions of risk averse agents and con-
ditions are discussed under which the efficient allocation may be de-
centralized. We highlight a number of differences with models where
transaction costs are exogenous, including the implications for taxa-
tion and measurement issues.
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1 Introduction
Models that incorporate transaction costs generally treat them as a ‘useful
formalism’ (Townsend, 1983). They are meant to capture the costs of col-
lecting information, of bargaining, organization, decision making, writing and
enforcing contracts between individuals, firms and the state (Coase, 1960).
The perception of such costs as exogenously impeding trade or inhibiting
the formation of complete contracts suggests that reducing, eliminating or
avoiding those costs is generally welfare enhancing.1 As the quality of insti-
tutions is thought to be a part of what explains those transaction costs,2 the
implication is that better institutions always improve economic outcomes.
Many of these transaction costs are not directly impeding trade, however,
but are resources allocated to technologies (or institutions) that facilitate
exchange, even though those resources could otherwise have been allocated
directly to the production of a consumption good. For example, the orga-
nization of the firm, the formation and nature of contracts, the emergence
and use of a legal system are all themselves technologies employed to ease
the conduct of exchange. Investments in such technologies – in the form of
legal or judiciary arrangements, management consultants, and so on – are
investments in an ‘institutional capital’. The consequence of such investment
is that the cost of an individual exchange can be lower. For example, the
expected loss from a trade may be reduced, or it may be less costly to assess
the quality of a traded good, if we have established standardized reporting
practices; an economy with a stronger contracting environment can limit
the losses from opportunistic behavior in trading; and so on. Moreover, the
investments in exchange technologies can be private or public. Private in-
vestment in such capital could involve the formulation of trading standards
within a coalition of traders, for example: There is an upfront cost to es-
tablishing and enforcing those standards but these may lower intermediation
costs because trading risk is reduced. Public investment may be improve-
1See, for example, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Townsend and Ueda (2006) in
relation to finance, growth and inequality; Levchenko (2007) on international trade; and
Dixit (1996) on political economy.
2See Levchenko (2007) and Acemoglu et al. (2007) for a similar perspective.
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ments in property rights legislation that make the transfer of assets more
secure; again, such improvements are costly but they may reduce the costs of
individual trades if it leads to fewer losses from disputed exchanges. Each of
these costs may be categorized as ‘transaction costs’ but they can serve quite
different purposes: Some are investments that facilitate exchange; some, such
as trading risk or legal fees, are the subsequent costs of exchange.
We develop a model in which risk-averse agents who do not know their
own production technology may, in advance of the productivity realization,
form a coalition to share consumption risk. Agents face a cost to exchange
output, however, and that cost of exchange is determined by investment in
exchange cost-reducing institutions. Total transaction costs are then the sum
of two components: There is a cost to forming the public and private insti-
tutions that govern, ex ante, the terms of exchange, and there are costs to
conducting exchange once the state of nature is resolved.3 Agents choose the
resources allocated to reducing exchange costs and the extent of diversifica-
tion (how extensively they will trade with others).
A number of results follow from modelling transaction costs as an en-
dogenous component of a general equilibrium set-up. We first characterize
the optimal allocation. Naturally, while the costs of exchange can be can be
too high, they can also be too low. A high exchange cost reflects fewer re-
sources directed towards facilitating transactions but may be associated with
greater expected utility if those free resources are put to productive use and
if agents choose to make fewer costly exchanges. Understanding these issues
is directly important for policy design since many public institutions, such
as the legal system, are bound up in the costs of trade. Real-world policies
are generally based around simple objectives such as maximizing the size of
markets or minimizing the cost of an individual exchange. Given the absence
of a framework in which to account for the general equilibrium consequences
of transaction costs, we cannot understand the welfare-ranking of different
simple policies. Having established the optimal allocation, and since our
3Throughout, an ‘exchange cost’ is the cost of conducting a particular exchange and
what we refer to as the ‘transaction cost’ is the sum of investments in institutions and the
subsequent costs of exchanges that occur.
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model can be considered quantitatively, we can conduct such an analysis.
By far the most damaging type of simple policy, in welfare terms, is one
that focuses on minimizing the costs of individual exchange. The intuition is
as follows: The optimal allocation represents a trade-off between the portion
of the endowment that goes to production (i.e., net of transaction costs)
and the amount of consumption variability. The minimum-exchange cost
policy is so damaging because it ignores both consumption variability and
the overall costs of transactions. A policy that targets market size is less
damaging since it minimizes the overall consumption variability and allows
agents to respond in their private investment decisions. The least damaging
of the simple policies we consider is a policy which minimizes the overall size
of the transaction sector. Under this policy, agents can respond to deviations
from an optimal tax policy by varying both the amount they trade and their
private investments in exchange.
In addition to policies that distort allocations to the institutional capital,
we also consider the effect of a transactions tax. Agents invest more in insti-
tutions to ameliorate the effect of the tax on the costs of exchange, thereby
making diversification decisions less sensitive to increases in the transactions
tax. However, while apparently robust to the imposition of a transaction tax,
agents opt for autarky at a lower transaction tax than might be anticipated
using a model of exogenous transaction costs.
We can also use our quantitative model to put the empirical evidence on
transaction costs into some context. Coase (1992, p.716) argues that “a large
part” of economic activity is directed at alleviating transaction costs. In a
first attempt to quantify the aggregate extent of such resources, Wallis and
North (1986) estimate that what they term the transaction sector comprised
half of US GNP in 1970, a proportion which had grown significantly over the
preceding century. Moreover, Klaes (2008) concludes that economies with
less sophisticated transaction sectors appear, at an aggregate level, to exhibit
lower levels of transaction costs. In our model, a more wealthy economy
is characterized by a smaller transaction sector, but one based on greater
investments in institutions, larger markets and lower exchange costs. This
is consistent with the evidence in Klaes (2008), that, at a micro-level, the
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costs of exchange are high when the aggregate transaction sector appears to
be small.
Our framework relates to a number of other papers. The idea that in-
vestments in better transaction technologies can be part of an efficient eco-
nomic system has been put forward by De Alessi (1983), Barzel (1985) and
Williamson (1998). In making transaction costs endogenous, we are also
blurring the distinction between institutional and technological efficiency, as
Antra`s and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) have noted in a survey on organizations
and trade. In that literature, decisions on organizational arrangments and on
trade are interrelated. In our approach, agents make joint-decisions about
their productive capacity, risk sharing and the investments in institutions
that govern the costliness of trade. Finally, the gains from allocating re-
sources to institutions relates to the idea of a ‘state capacity’ in Besley and
Persson (2010). State capacity is partly “legal infrastructure investments
such as building court systems, educating and employing judges and regis-
tering property or credit” (p.6). In that model, equilibrium investments in
legal capacity are increasing in national income. Our approach also considers
the possibility of a ‘private capacity’ that might substitute for or complement
investments in public institutions.
The model is set out in Section 2. Section 3 characterizes efficient equi-
libria, that is the optimal investment in institutional capital, the optimal
extent of transaction costs and the optimal market size. The conditions are
discussed in Section 4 under which the efficient equilibrium may be decen-
tralized. Section 5 reports the implications of our model in the light of extant
empirical evidence. Section 6 examines the impact of (simple) non-optimal
institutions and also looks at the impact of an exogenous transaction tax.
Having established the efficient allocation in Section 3, we can compute the
welfare cost of each of these policies. Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
Appendices contain some proofs, further numerical analysis of the model and
a detailed description of the decentralized equilibrium.
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2 The model: overview
We briefly outline the model (which is motivated by Townsend, 1978) before
presenting it in detail. A large number of risk averse agents are each endowed
with the same amount of capital. That capital can be combined with a pro-
duction technology to produce a consumption good. Agents can differ in the
technology with which they can produce the consumption good but, initially,
they know only the distribution of possible technologies. Consumption risk
can be reduced by forming markets with other agents but due to exchange
costs it is not feasible to replicate a complete Arrow-Debreu allocation. The
cost of each bilateral exchange is determined in a simple way by the qual-
ity of contracting institutions in the economy. As such, before they realise
their productivity, agents decide whether or not to form a market with other
agents and, if they do, how large that market should be and how much to
invest in private (i.e., excludable) and public institutional quality.4
One agent per market becomes an intermediary, buying outputs and sell-
ing consumption bundles. Intermediaries are here the productive unit of the
transaction sector, using the institutional capital as input to a common ‘ex-
change cost technology’ (ECT), the output of which is the exchange cost
incurred by agents in its market. Ex post, agents honor their obligations
even if it would be preferable to renege. If agents do not join a market then
no institutional investment takes place. The primary aim of Sections 3-4 is
to characterize the efficient level of institutional capital, exchange costs and
market size (consumption risk-sharing) for such a model economy.
2.1 Preferences and production technology
The economy is populated by a countable infinity of agents, i ∈ I. All agents
have the same utility function, u (c), with a constant degree of relative risk
aversion. Each is endowed with the same amount of capital, 0 < k < ∞.
Agent i produces amount λiyi of the non-storable consumption good, where
4Intuitively, consider the adoption, ex ante, of standard accounting practices by a set
of firms. It is doubtless costly to establish such a framework. However, ex post, there are
still costs to running the system such as inputting data or prudential auditing.
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yi ≤ k is the amount of capital used in production and λi the idiosyncratic
production technology. The set of possible technologies, Λ, is finite and
bounded away from infinity. λi is distributed i.i.d. across agents with p
(
λi
)
denoting the probability of any agent drawing λi, and
∑
λ∈Λ p (λ) = 1.
Let ω represent the state of nature, i.e., a list of λi for all i ∈ I. Let Ω
be the set of all possible states of nature, and p (ω) the probability of some
ω occurring and
∫
ω∈Ω p(ω) = 1.
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2.2 Diversification and intermediation
To diversify against risk, agents can form markets in a star network around
a single intermediary, as in Townsend (1978). A market is a set of agents
M ⊂ I with cardinality #M < ℵ0; so a market is finite-sized. The set of
agents with whom agent i exchanges directly is denoted N i. Agent h ∈M is
an intermediary if N i = h for i ∈M\h and Nh = M\h. So defined, markets
are disjoint and agents only exchange with one intermediary. Mh denotes
the market intermediated by agent h ∈ H where H ⊆ I is the set of all
intermediaries in the economy.
Agents can exchange some of their endowment of capital on a one-for-one
basis for shares in the consumption portfolio compiled by the intermediary,
less their contributions to the total costs of transactions. Each agent in a
market exchanges twice with the intermediary and pays an equal share of
market-wide exchange costs. So for a given exchange cost, α, the per-agent
cost of exchange in a market of size #M is 2α
(
#M−1
#M
)
.
2.3 Institutional capital and exchange costs
Intermediaries form markets using institutional capital as an input to an
exchange cost technology (ECT) which determines the cost of exchange in
that market. There is free-entry to intermediation (i.e., the ECT is ac-
cessible to all agents). Institutional capital takes two forms: There is a
market-specific institutional capital (S-capital) and a general economy-wide
5Precisely, p(ω) is the probability of the state of nature in a small interval dω occurring.
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institutional capital (G-capital). We assume that the specific capital is ex-
cludable to a market and agent i allocates a proportion τ is of the endowment
as a private investment in this local capital. The general capital is a public
good, each an agent i making a public investment τ ig of the endowment. S-
capital thus reflects activities specific to the transaction being made – such
as organizational choices, standardization of quality, private infrastructures
or learning about property rights – and is excludable to the market. On the
other hand, G-capital reflects the general legal enforcement of contracts, fidu-
ciary duties, public infrastructures or competition policy and is, by contrast,
a public good.
In a market intermediated by agent h, the exchange cost, αh, is deter-
mined as follows:
αh =
[
1− F (Sh, G)] k. (1)
where F () is the ECT, which is concave, continuous and increasing in each
of its arguments and satisfies some Inada-type conditions.6 The range of F
is the unit interval, so 0 ≤ αh ≤ k. Since the exchange cost is proportional
to k it is akin to an ‘iceberg cost’. We assume that S-capital is the average
contribution of agents in a market and G-capital is the average across the
whole economy.7 Given that all agents are identical ex ante, all will make
the same allocations and so we generally omit superscripts. Clearly, then,
S ≤ τ sk and G ≤ τ gk. The ex ante allocations, (τ s + τ g) k, combined with
the ex post costs, 2α
(
#M−1
#M
)
, make up total transaction costs.
Since the intention of this paper is to explore the general equilibrium
implications of agent investments in reducing exchange costs, the equation
for the exchange cost, α, is left as a reduced-form expression. The expression
for α imposes: i) That zero ex ante spending on institutions means no trade;
ii) that greater ex ante investments reduce the costs of individual ex post
6Namely: F (0, 0) = 0 and F (S,G) → 1 as {S,G} → {∞,∞}. Next, FS(S,G) → ∞
as S → 0, and FS(S,G) → 0 as S → ∞; analogous conditions obtain with respect to
G. So defined, F ensures that the ‘null’ arrangement of zero investment in S-capital and
G-capital is always equivalent to there being no gains from trade.
7In other words, there is no institutional scale effect: The introduction of an agent
into a market requires an equal additional contribution to keep the exchange cost for that
market constant.
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trades; iii) there are decreasing returns to investing in the institutions, and
iv) zero exchange costs require infinite investment. Nevertheless, there are a
number of specific mechanisms that may generate transaction costs in a way
captured by equation (1).
First, we may consider the transaction cost to the be product of the
“transfer of property rights” (Allen, 2000, p.901). That is, there are frictions
associated with a transaction because of the “costs of bookkeeping, the cost
of enforcement, the cost of monitoring...” (Townsend, 1983; p.259). That
‘cost’ is related, however, to the institutional capital from which the agents
in the exchange can draw; the form of (1) imposes a natural relationship
between investments in that institutional capital and the consequent cost of
conducting exchange. The costs of enforcing a contract is a product of the
quality of the legal system, for example. Consider, for example, the problem
of trading an item of unknown quality. This mechanism can be motivated
using an example in Langlois (2006). Prior to the coming of the railroad to
the American Midwest in the mid-nineteenth century, the trade of grain could
be conducted on a personal basis with quality levels maintained through the
observed reputation of individual farmers. Once the railroads vastly increased
the scale of trade, individual farmer grains became mixed and the grains were
traded as commodities in a way detached from their original producer, thus
breaking the prior system of quality control. In response, the Chicago Board
of Trade (CBOT) was formed to standardize the nature of the grain trade.
Setting up such standards was costly but there were also continuing costs of
inspecting each transaction for conformance. The CBOT reduced the risks
involved in making an individual exchange of grain, reducing the margin
required by traders engaged in buying and selling grain.
A second perspective is one of incomplete contracts, i.e., that transaction
costs are “the costs of establishing and maintaining property rights” (Allen,
2000; p.898). Hart and Moore (2008) introduce a model in which the broad
outlines of trade may be defined ex ante. Ex post, there are costs to fill
in the detail of the finer points. A contract embodies a trade-off between
flexibility and rigidity in which an optimal arrangement may not be fully
specified over all possible states of nature. For Hart and Moore (2008), the
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costs from such partial incompleteness can take the form of a deadweight
loss. We may also think of this in the context of complexity (cf. Anderlini
and Felli, 1999). In the context of our model, goods may be produced with
different technologies that require specific contracts that are complex (costly)
to write. To write ex ante contracts for each possible technology would be
exorbitantly expensive, but to write no contracts ex ante would mean that, ex
post, there would be no trade. Ex ante investments in legal and accounting
systems could mean that agents are committed to trade under the rough
outlines of an agreement, leaving the costs of writing specific contracts for
individual trades to be incurred after the state of the world is known.
The distinction between the specific and general determinants of the costs
of exchange also emerges from this literature. Williamson (1979) refers to the
‘governance of contractual relations’. Anderlini and Felli (1999) consider that
some of what determines the extent of complexity costs is environmental,
since a contract is “‘embedded’ in a larger legal system” (ibid. p.25). A
second determinant is specific to the market in which the contract is formed.
The distinction between S- and G-capital can also be motivated using the
example of the Chicago Board of Trade. The CBOT was established by
local businesses, the standards were private to the CBOT and benefited the
farmers and traders that used it. However, there were also public goods that
made the CBOT effective. In 1859, for example, it obtained the authority of
the State legislature to appoint grain inspectors with powers of enforcement.
Without the public institutional input, the sector-specific arrangement may
have been less effective.
Each type of institutional capital may impact upon the other in deter-
mination of exchange costs. In our baseline case, we assume that S and G
are complementary inputs, so FSG = FGS > 0. This is the form of rela-
tionship described in connection to the CBOT: Without a public institution,
the S-capital would be less effective; without S-capital, there may be little
point in an economy-wide institution. In our robustness analysis below we
also consider the impact of their being substitutes. There is an additional
form of complementarity that we will not consider: Private investments in
the specific capital of one market may not be excludable, instead benefiting
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other markets. For example, it may have been that the establishment of
the CBOT demonstrated the feasibilty of such an arrangement, serving as a
blueprint for additional Boards elsewhere. A version of this model with ex
ante heterogeneity may naturally incorporate such a form of investment if in-
vestments in markets composed of one type of agent affected exchange costs
in other markets also composed of that agent type. In this model, all agents
are ex ante identical and so we leave this consideration for future work.
3 Efficient equilibria
The purpose of this Section is to characterize efficient allocations in a cooper-
ative setting; i.e., in an economy where intermediaries arise exogenously and
where there is no difficulty providing the public good, G. We subsequently
show that the efficient cooperative allocations coincide with those that are in
the core (Proposition 5), and then that competitive equilibria are Pareto op-
timal under some conditions on the provision of G (Section 4). The intention
is to use the efficient allocation in order to quantify the welfare implications
of distortive institutional arrangements in Section 6. We can draw a number
of contrasts with Townsend (1978) before proceeding. In that paper, the
optimal cost of bilateral exchange is always zero and Townsend shows that,
in the presence of such a cost, core allocations may include finite-sized coali-
tions of agents organized around a single intermediary. We use the exogenous
exchange cost model in Townsend (1978) as a starting point, but in making
exchange costs endogenous, we need then to characterise the existence and
uniqueness of equilibria with optimally non-zero exchange cost. That also
entails establishing the existance and uniqueness of an optimal market size
given the optimal exchange costs.
An intermediary h makes an allocation for a market which is an n-tuple
{#M, {τ s, τ g}, α, y, ci(ω)}. The intermediary allocation is that which max-
imises his own expected utility,
max
#M,τs,τg ,α
{∫
ω∈Ω
p (ω)u
[
ch(ω)
]}
(2)
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subject to, ∑
i∈M
ci(ω) ≤
∑
i∈M
λi(ω)y (3)
2α(#M − 1) ≤ #M [(1− τ s − τ g)k − y] ; (4)
G ≤ τ gk; (5)
S ≤ τ sk; (6)
τ s + τ g ≤ 1; τ s ≥ 0; τ g ≥ 0; (7)
α = [1− F (S,G)] k; (8)
E
[
u
(
ci
) |h] ≥ E [u (ci|h′)] ∀i,∀h′, for h′ feasible. (9)
Equation (3) limits consumption to be less than or equal to output in each
state of nature, on a market-wide basis. Equation (4) says that, in any mar-
ket, the sum of endowments net of production and institutional investment
must be sufficient to cover the total of market exchange costs. Equations (5)-
(6) describe institutional capital, (7) restricts the range of feasible {τ s, τ g},
and (8) describes the exchange cost. Finally, equation (9) is a participation
constraint requiring that the utility of all agents in market h be at least as
high as participating in another feasible market. Implicit in the maximisation
of (2) is a participation constraint for the intermediary; if,
∑
λ∈Λ
p (λ)u [λk] >
∫
ω∈Ω
p (ω)u
[
ch(ω)|h] , for all h feasible,
then no intermediated market with exchange is formed (i.e., #M = 1, τ s =
τ g = 0).
3.1 Optimality
All agents share an aliquot consumption payout in each market as determined
by the observed average technology for that market, λ¯(ω, h) = (#M)−1
∑
i∈Mh λ
i(ω).
One more assumption is required before stating Proposition 1 which estab-
lishes that well-defined solutions to (2) exist. Recall that total per capita
costs are 2α
(
#M−1
#M
)
. If for all k it is the case that (1− τ s − τ g) k ≤ 2α,
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then the optimal market size will be bounded since perfect diversification
would imply non-positive consumption. Hence, let an arbitrary maximum
value of k be k¯. Let K ≡ [k, k¯] where k < k¯, be the set of potential endow-
ments. When k = k¯, as shown below, investments in ECT will be at their
maximum level: τ¯ s, τ¯ g.
8 A sufficient condition for finite-sized markets to be
part of the optimal plan is then,
2(1−maxF (·)) ≥ (1− τ¯ s − τ¯ g). (10)
(10) ensures that there exists a M¯ ≥ #M(k¯), where M¯ is a finite integer
which may serve as an upper bound on optimal market size. Let M ≡[
1, ..., M¯
]
be the set of feasible market sizes. In short, (10) imposes that
exchange costs do not fall ‘too quickly’ as institutional capital rises.
Proposition 1 For each (k, ω) , (i) the maximum of (2) is attained and (ii)
the value function, V (k), is well-defined and continuous. (iii) The optimal
policy correspondence may not be unique.
Proof. The relevant measure space is given by the triple (Ω, ω, p), where ω is
a σ-algebra, the collection of all the subsets of Ω, and p is the measure defined
on ω. An agent’s expected utility is, therefore, Eu(c) ≡ ∫
ω∈Ω p(ω)u (c (ω)),
where the utility function is strictly concave. Also, note that:
k ∈ K ⊂ R++; (11)
{τ s, τ g} ∈ T ⊂ R2+; (12)
#M ∈M ⊂ N. (13)
Decisions on τ s, τ g and #M are taken after k is known but before agents’
productivities are revealed. Using (12) and (13), define the feasible policy
choices as follows: Γ : K → T ×M. That is, T ×M is the product space,
{〈
[0, 1]2, 1
〉
,
〈
[0, 1]2, 2
〉
,
〈
[0, 1]2, 3
〉
, ...,
〈
[0, 1]2, M¯
〉}
.
8S-capital and G-capital are essentially normal goods, ‘purchases’ of both rising in k.
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For each ω ∈ Ω, Γ is clearly a non-empty, compact-valued, continuous corre-
spondence. A typical element of that mapping is denoted z ∈ Γ(k, ω). The
optimization problem, therefore, involves a strictly concave criterion function
and a non-empty, compact constraint set, so that the maximum is attained.
Since the maximum is attained, the value function, V (k), is well-defined. It
follows from the Theorem of the Maximum that V (k) is continuous. As the
feasible policy set is not strictly convex, the optimal policy
G(k, ω) = {z ∈ Γ(k, ω) : Eu(c) = V (k)}
need not be unique. Finally, the equivalence between the cooperative case
and core allocations is established in Proposition 5.
Some properties of efficient equilibria are immediate. Since the ECT is
freely accessible, rents from intermediation must be zero so (5)–(6) hold with
equality. The optimal allocations to the ECT is the pair
{
τ ∗s, τ
∗
g
}
which
satisfies,
θkFS = 1; (14)
θkFG = 1, (15)
where θ ≡ 2
(
#M−1
#M
)
, and FX (X ≡ S,G) denotes a partial derivative of
F
(
Sh, G
)
. So, for any market size, the optimal institutional investments
equate the marginal cost with the marginal gain from reducing the exchange
cost. When there are no transactions, agents would not undertake such
investment and the optimal choice of market size satisfies
arg max
θ
Eu((1− θ) kλ). (16)
Clearly, the optimal market size is unity, θ = 0. The choices τ s = 0, τ g = 0
and #M = 1 also define the unique reservation utility for any agent to
be a member of any #M > 1 coalition, V =
∑
λ∈Λ p (λ)u [λk], ∀k. That
furthermore ensure that 0 ≤ (τ s + τ g) < 1.9 A direct implication of the
9That (16) generates a unique reservation value of utility is not quite so trivial as it
may at first appear. In particular, it is different to Townsend (1978). In that paper, agents
take the per capita exchange cost as given. Even so, the optimal market size may well be
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reservation value of utility is that any equilibrium of the model in which
τ s > 0 and τ g > 0 is one in which #M > 1, necessarily.
Remark 1 follows from analysis of (14) and (15):
Remark 1 For #M > 1 and endowment k, Equations (14) and (15) define
a unique pair,
{
τ#Ms , τ
#M
g
}
such that τ#Ms > 0 and τ
#M
g > 0. For #M =
1, equations (14) and (15) imply τ#Ms = 0 and τ
#M
g = 0. For a given
endowment, optimal investments in the ECT rise and bilateral exchange costs
fall as the market size increases.
The choice of any market size greater than one is determined by the ECT
and agents’ attitude to risk. (14) and (15) determine efficient investment in
the ECT and hence total resources diverted from goods production. Agents’
risk aversion provides an upper bound on how much they are willing to pay
for consumption insurance, given an alternative not to diversify; that bound
is independent of the ECT. Agents will optimally form markets with #M > 1
when efficient investment in the ECT delivers transaction costs lower than
that bound.10
The rest of the analysis of equilibrium is contained in the following four
Propositions. One can show that in general there is a critical level of k below
which transaction costs dominate and agents do not diversify:
Proposition 2 There is a k > 0 small enough such that optimal market size
is one.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The key to understanding that Proposition is to recall that S = τ sk. So,
a given τ has a larger proportionate impact on α as k rises, even though α
itself is proportional to k. Hence, higher levels of k permit lower ex post
greater than one. In the present set-up, when agents take the exchange cost as given, the
optimal market size is necessarily one. This is due to our scaling the exchange cost by
capital.
10That explains why agents may move from ‘autarky’ (#M = 1) to a market size #M >
2 for a small change in k. This is apparent in the numerical simulations – diverisficiation
at market sizes in between is too costly given the ECT and the degree of risk aversion.
Proposition 3 shows that subsequent increases in market size will be in steps of one.
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transaction costs and help sustain larger market sizes and the benefits from
consumption risk sharing.
Proposition 2 also indicates the possibility of multiple optimal plans.
Proposition 3 now shows that no more than two such alternative plans can
exist.
Proposition 3 The optimal policy correspondence contains at most two plans.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As a corollary, it follows that for any #M > 1 which is optimal, subse-
quent market size increases are single steps for (sufficiently large) increases
in k. The final Proposition and following remarks establish that multiple
equilibria can arise although they are, in a sense, special cases.
Proposition 4 Let K denote the Borel sets of K ⊂ R++. There exists a
level of k ∈ K, call it k∗, such that
Eu
{
[(1− τ 1) k∗ − θ1α1] λ¯
(
ω,Mh1
)}
= Eu
{
[(1− τ 2) k∗ − θ2α2] λ¯
(
ω,Mh2
)}
where τ 1 6= τ 2, α1 6= α2, Mh1 6= Mh2 and where maximized utility is identical
under both programs.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The set of values of k which result in multiple equilibria is of measure
zero. That is, such values of k∗ correspond to pairs of θ′s; these θ′s are
a proper subset of the rationals and hence themselves drawn from a set of
measure zero.
To summarize: Low endowment economies may resort to autarky (Propo-
sition 2). However, for economies with larger endowments (k > k) it is opti-
mal to invest in the ECT and to form markets (Proposition 1 and Remark
1). Equilibrium plans need not be unique (Proposition 4) but those equilib-
ria are, in a sense, of limited interest (Proposition 3 and the brief discussion
following Proposition 4). Finally:
Proposition 5 The allocations of the cooperative economy coincide with
core allocations.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
4 Equilibrium with competitive intermedia-
tion
The question now is: Can the efficient outcome be decentralized? First, note
that given the public good nature of the G-capital, there is a free-riding
problem associated with investment in G-capital:
Proposition 6 In the core, voluntary allocations to general capital are zero.
Proof. See Appendix B.
There are a number of ways in which the public good problem inherent in
G may be addressed. The simplest is to suppose that a state institution exists
and is capable of enforcing a tax rate. In the absence of any rent-seeking,
that institution can deliver the optimal tax rate. However, given that our
economy has free-entry to private, coalition-level provision of specific capital,
we may think of a public analogue to that in terms of competitive provision
of a public good. In particular, suppose that there is free-entry to the public,
economy wide provision of general institutional capital. While there is no ex
ante political conflict here, there may be a need to establish a mandate for a
public institution to tax all agents equally even though individual agents may
not wish to follow through in that way. This is reminiscent of the arguments
of Schumpeter (1942, p. 269), who asserted that political markets work in
much the same way as do competitive economic markets: “(T)he democratic
method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions
in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people’s vote.” These arguments were later echoed forcefully
by Wittman (1989).11
We formalize this perspective and consider the outcome to be the result
of a market with free-entry: Any agent can costlessly seek a mandate that
11Wittman (1989, pp. 1395–6) argues “...that democratic political markets are organized
to promote wealth-maximizing outcomes, that these markets are highly competitive and
that political entrepreneurs are rewarded for efficient behavior.”
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specifies taxes for all agents and the level of G-capital to be provided. The
successful mandate is that with the largest share of votes and is, we assume,
then enforced ex post.12 Proposition 7 shows that such competition then
yields an efficient outcome; the competitive G provision will be G∗ = τ ∗gk.
Proposition 7 If any agent may propose an enforceable tax plan then all
agents will be taxed according to (15). It follows that G = G∗.
Proof. See Appendix B.
There is no such problem in the provision of S-capital as free-entry to
intermediation (i.e., any agent may become an intermediary) ensures that
all rents are competed away. In Appendix C the decentralized economy is
studied. It is established that there exists a unique, Pareto-optimal allocation
in each market with a unique intermediary in each market.
Proposition 8 If the public good is provided according to Proposition 7,
the provision of S-capital and G-capital is Pareto optimal in the competitive
equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix C.
5 The size of the transaction sector
The empirical literature on transaction costs has focused on the costs of
individual transactions, or individual organizational arrangements. Insofar
as they can be measured, the size of such costs are considered a measure
of the working of the market. Examples in a variety of different contexts,
from property rights to finance, are noted in Allen (2000). In contrast to the
study of individual transactions, there has been limited work to establish the
size of transaction costs on aggregate. Wallis and North (1986) were the first
to quantify the size of the US transaction sector. By dividing occupations
into those classified as providing ‘transaction services’ to firms and those
12So we invoke ex ante perfect competition and ex post monopoly in the process of
allocating a mandate. Relaxation of either assumption might provide a focus for under-
standing the existence and power of elites.
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that provide primarly ‘transformative’ services, Wallis and North calculate
the total remuneration to transaction occupations. This sum constitutes
the size of the transaction sector. They found that in 1870, the transaction
sector accounted for 25% of GNP, rising to 50% in 1970.13 The Wallis and
North methodology has been applied to Australia (Dollery and Leong, 2002),
Bulgaria (Chobanov and Egbert, 2007) and New Zealand (Hazledine, 2001)
with similar magnitudes and trends found in each.
We thus have two observations from different empirical literatures on
transaction costs: First, the size of the transaction sector is large and pos-
itively related to wealth; and, second, low transaction costs are one of the
spurs of development.14 The model presented here offers a natural way to
consider both observations and to suggest directions for future empirical
work. As we have defined them, transaction costs are composed of the costs
of making individual exchanges and the investments in exchange institutions.
Our model, then, hinges on a distinction between ex ante and ex post costs
which is not a focus of empirical study. However, we take the empirical ev-
idence on individual arrangements to reflect an individual ex post exchange
cost (α) in the model. While the aggregate evidence will likewise capture the
ex post exchange cost, it will also include resources allocated to exchange
cost-reducing activities. We can draw some tentative comparisons between
the model implications and the data, therefore. However, one of the im-
plications of this framework is that if empirical work accounted for both
components of total transaction costs, the evidence presented by Wallis and
North (1986) may be more fully understood.
We let κ measure the size of the transaction sector (the proportion of the
endowment not allocated to the production of the consumption god):
κ ≡ (k − y)/k = τ s + τ g + θ [1− F (S,G)] (17)
13The transaction sector appears to be important in other advanced economies. See
Wang (2003) and Klaes (2008) for surveys.
14Consider the conclusions in Klaes (2008): “ ...economies with less well-developed
transaction sectors appear to exhibit lower levels of transaction costs if those costs are
measured in terms of sector size, whereas micro-structurally those economies in fact suffer
from higher levels of transaction costs due to significant barriers to smooth exchange and
coordination of economic activity.”
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Some comparative static results are intuitive. Suppose that at some k, the
optimal market size is #M ′ > 1; κ is necessarily higher at any #M ′′ > #M ′
since otherwise an equilibrium with lower transaction costs and better risk-
sharing properties is available. The higher is k, the lower is κ for any given
market size since agents invest more to reduce the costs of exchange (see
Appendix D). These results may be compared with those of Besley and
Persson (2010) who find equilibrium investments in ‘legal capacity’ increase
increase with national income. As k increases, then, the cost of further
diversification approaches the additional consumption-smoothing gain and
for a sufficiently large increase in k optimal market size increases.15 Figure
1 summarizes results from a numerical version of the model (see Appendix
E).16 One finds that optimal transaction costs can be substantial; that large
part of market activity referred to by Coase (1992) is reflected in our simple
general equilibrium framework.
Proportionate investments in institutions can increase in k, as Figure 1
demonstrates;17 while the number of exchanges increases and institutional
investment grows, total transaction costs ultimately fall (although the rela-
tion is non-monotonic). In other words, a wealthier economy has a larger
and more sophisticated transaction sector, one based on greater investments
in contracting institutions, larger markets and lower exchange costs. Em-
pirically, the payoff from the greater investments – lower costs of individual
exchanges – are difficult to identify in sectoral analyses which then mistake
the higher investments in institutions as higher transaction costs overall.
What appears to be obscured in the Wallis and North analysis is the dis-
tinction between ex ante investments in institutional capital and the ex post
cost of conducting exchange; empirical analyses which make that distinction
would appear worthwhile.
15Proposition 3 shows that market size must increase by one from any #M > 1, and
the discussion preceding Proposition 2 explains how market size can jump by more than
one when moving from #M = 1.
16We adopt an ECT with constant elasticity of substitution of 2 whilst agents have
a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 3. For Figure 1 we allow the effectiveness of S-
capital and G-capital to differ slightly, although none of our results are sensitive to this
assumption. See Appendix Table 2 for details.
17Appendix D identifies a sufficient condition on the ECT for that to be the case.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium over a range of the endowment
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These numerical results are robust to varying a number of different pa-
rameters, as shown in Appendix E. The coefficient or relative risk aversion
drives the extent of diversification but, so long as it does not shut down all
exchange, its impact on {τ s, τ g} and so κ, is limited. The baseline relative
risk aversion is γ = 3 and at k = 30, optimal #M = 18 while τ s = 0.0484,
τ g = 0.0616 and κ = 0.4930. Increasing the risk aversion parameter to 3.5
results in #M = 75 and τ s = 0.0507, τ g = 0.0684 and κ = 0.5100. Reducing
the risk aversion parameter to 2.5 causes all exchange to stop (i.e., optimal
#M = 1); with γ = 2.5, endogenous exchange occurs at k = 32.3. A further
robustness is to consider the efficacy of the allocations to the institutional
capital. In the baseline numerical simulations, the contributions τ sk and τ gk
are both weighted by a parameter β = 0.03. Increasing the parameter makes
the exchange cost lower for a given institutional capital. At β = 0.035, the
optimal #M = 30 while τ s = 0.0499, τ s = 0.0666 and κ = 0.4845; the more
effective is institutional capital, the higher are the optimal allocations, the
larger are markets and the lower is the size of the total transaction cost. A
final robustness is to consider the assumption of complementarity between
S and G capital. In the baseline we set the CES coefficient to s = 2. If we
modify this to s = −1,then optimal #M = 19 while τ s = 0.0503, τ g = 0.0595
and κ = 0.4935.
6 The impact of non-optimal public institu-
tions
So far the analysis has focused on the nature of efficient equilibria; the effi-
cient tax level, τ ∗g, provides an optimal trade-off between the expected level
of consumption and its variability. This Section considers the impact of dis-
tortive (i.e., non-optimal) levels of the tax, τ g.
18 First, we look at constrained
optimal decisions about τ s and #M over a range of imposed tax rates. Sec-
18In this section S-capital and G-capital are equally efficient in reducing transaction
costs so any difference between τs and τg reflects the institutional distortion. Specifically,
γs = γg = 0.075 and k = 30. All other parameters are as in Appendix Table 2 unless
otherwise stated.
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ond, we consider the welfare implications of various transaction cost policies.
Third, we model the impact of a tax on transactions.
6.1 Equilibrium with exogenous τ g
The distortive behavior centres on the resources turned over to G-capital via
the tax τ g. Such distortions might reflect deeper political tensions, perhaps
between the electorate and a ‘political class’. In an environment where the
definition and measurement of the costs of exchange are not well understood,
it may also be simply that the objective of tax policy is not straightforward
to design. Alternatively, deviations from optimality may reflect ‘irrational’
voters, as in Caplan (2008). First, we look at the consequence of varying τ g
over some interval. In Subsection 6.2, we look at particular policy objectives
that may drive specific deviations.
Figure 2 reports the consequences of varying τ g over the interval [0, 0.4].
Responses in τ s and #M are unconstrained but can be, of course, affected
by deviations in τ g from its efficient level. This can result in significant com-
pensating changes in agent behavior, as Figure 2 shows. When τ g deviates
from τ ∗g agents can respond by changing τ s and/or market size. If market
size does not change, then τ s varies positively with τ g. This follows from
(14) and the assumption that S and G are complementary inputs; a higher
G increases the marginal return to S-capital investment. For a sufficiently
large increase in τ g, the constrained optimal choice of market size may also
change by increasing or decreasing. Increasing τ g holding #M fixed clearly
reduces net endowment since the optimal τ s also increases. One response
is to recover some lost productive capacity by reducing the number of ex-
changes (lower #M). Another response is to take advantage of the lower
exchange cost created by the higher τ g and diversify further (higher #M).
For this parameterization, market size is hump-shaped in the level of τ g. At
low levels of τ g, there remains a substantial residual endowment and so the
gain from additional risk-sharing dominates: A sufficiently large increase in
τ g lowers the exchange cost such that increasing market size (further risk-
sharing) is attractive enough to incur the cost of a higher κ. However, for
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Figure 2: Equilibrium with distortive institutions
τ g  τ ∗g the residual endowment is severely diminished. Diverting additional
resources away from production is more costly than the gain from further
diversification; as such, market size and τ s both fall because that is the only
way to reduce κ.
At very low levels of τ g, exchange costs are so high that no diversification
is worthwhile (agents set τ s = 0 and #M = 1). When τ g is very high,
the loss to productive capital is such that no diversification with τ s = 0
and #M = 1 is better than some diversification with the small residual
endowment, even though the endowment are still being taxed. In short,
market size is hump-shaped in τ g and, for some low and high values of τ g,
agents optimally choose not to diversify. The general pattern of robustness to
parameters discussed in the previous section holds with regard to the effect
of distortive institutions; in particular, the non-monotonic responses of τ s
and #M to changes in τ g holds across a range of endowment levels and risk
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Figure 3: Welfare Costs of Distortionary Institutions
aversion parameters. The non-monotonicity of #M is also robust to making
S and G capital input-substitutes in the exchange cost technology, although
the relationship between τ s and τ g is, of course, negative when we assume
they are substitutes (aside from increases in τ s that result from increasing
#M).
Given that Section 11 has established the efficient outcome, we can cal-
culate the consumption equivalent loss for each level of τ g relative to that
efficient frontier. In particular, if uτ
′
g is the utility obtained under policy τ ′g,
then the percentage loss in consumption that is equivalent to moving from
τ ∗g to τ
d
g can be calculated as
[
1− u−1
(
uτ
d
g
)
/u−1
(
uτ
∗
g
)] × 100. As Figure
3 shows, deviation in τ g from its optimal level can have significant welfare
costs. A τ g that is 0.05 higher than optimal is equivalent to a 2.7% drop in
consumption; a τ g that is 0.15 higher than optimal is equivalent to a 15.1%
drop in consumption.
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6.2 Specific transaction cost policies
The discussion of the empirical evidence above points to the complexity of
classifying and measuring transaction costs in reality. In the light of that,
it is reasonable to consider an environment where the optimal tax policy is
unclear. The literature on transaction cost economics suggests that opti-
mality is where “transactions. . . are aligned with governance structures. . . so
as to effect a (mainly) transaction cost economizing outcome” (Williamson,
2010: p.681). The interpretation of that optimality condition in terms of
policy may be complicated since there are multiple observable and poten-
tially non-observable components: The number of exchanges (market size),
the investments in reducing the cost of exchange, and the cost of exchange
itself. As such, a policy maker may have as its objective some minimum or
maximum of each of these and think it a reasonable interpretation of what is
optimal: First, institutions could deliver zero exchange costs; second, insti-
tutions should maximise risk-sharing; third, the cost of individual exchanges
should be minimized19; and, fourth, institutions should minimize the size of
the transaction sector as a whole.
In our model, zero exchange costs are not feasible; institutions which de-
liver an infinite number of trades at zero cost are themselves infinitely costly.
However, the analysis above shows that we can consider the second, third
and fourth type of policy prescription. The second is a rule that maximizes
the (constrained optimal) choice of market size; the third minimizes the cost
of individual exchanges; the fourth minimizes size of the transaction sector.
The market size policy is given by,
τMg := {min {τ g|#M ≥ #M ′} and τ s optimal} . (18)
That is, τMg is the lowest tax required to induce the maximum market size,
given that agents optimally choose market size and τ s in response to τ g. The
tax that minimizes the exchange cost is given by,
19We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this policy.
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ταg := min {α|#M > 1 and τ s optimal} . (19)
Finally, the tax policy which minimizes the transaction sector is given by,
τκg := min {κ|#M > 1 and τ s optimal} . (20)
For each policy the percentage change in certainty equivalent consumption
is calculated using the efficient frontier established in Section 3. Table 1
describes various features of equilibrium under the different rules.
Table 1: The Effects of Distortive Institutions.
rule #M κ τ g τ s α %C
τ ∗g 18 0.4940 0.0550 0.0550 6.0795 -
τMg 28 0.5234 0.1210 0.0571 5.3711 4.3368
ταg 11 0.6781 0.3520 0.0548 4.4776 38.2895
τκg 14 0.4906 0.0376 0.0537 6.4502 0.6400
None of the rules are optimal in a framework with endogenous transaction
costs; the τMg rule delivers too little directly productive capital and τ
κ
g too
much consumption variability. The ταg rule delivers a worse outcome in both
regards. Under the ταg rule, the policy to minimize individual exchange costs
involves setting the tax to the highest level without shutting down all ex-
change, regardless of the effect on total transaction costs or on the amount
of consumption variability. The economy is pushed toward low-market size
(high consumption variability) and low productive capital. This results in a
consumption equivalent loss far in excess of the other rules. Nonetheless, it is
useful to analyze which of τMg and τ
κ
g is the more costly, and why. Consider
first the τMg rule. Larger markets means, in short, higher taxation to lower
the costs of bilateral exchange. The transaction sector is larger as a whole
and its composition has shifted toward ex ante investments. τ g cannot in-
crease by too much, however, since agents always have the option of shifting
resources to goods production by reducing market size and τ s. For the τ
κ
g
rule, minimizing transaction costs requires exchange costs to be too high. A
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low τ g means that agents optimally form smaller markets and make smaller
investment in S-capital, both actions reducing κ.
The loss from τMg is greater than that from τ
κ
g , but both are eclipsed by
the ταg rule.
20 Expected utility is a product of the portion of the endowment
that is productive (1−κ) and the amount of consumption variability (#M).
The extreme costliness of the ταg rule results from neglecting both of these.
In this sense, our distinction between the costs of exchange and the total
costs of the transaction sector is particularly important: An apparently sen-
sible policy to minimize the costs of exchange, while neglecting the resources
required to obtain that minimization, is highly distortive. The comparison
between τMg and τ
κ
g is also informative: Institutions fostering smaller ex-
change costs and bigger markets appear to be the more damaging in welfare
terms. By targeting market size, the government ‘distorts’ choices of both
#M and τ g, leaving agents, in effect, with only one instrument to respond,
τ s. The alternative τ
κ
g , which minimizes the sum of all resources allocated to
transactions, leaves private agents with the choice of market size and τ s. The
option for agents simply to consume their own endowment constrains policy
such that the outcome is not too far from that which maximizes expected
utility. That additional flexibility appears to reflect some of the empirical
findings of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). That paper finds that bad prop-
erty rights institutions are more damaging that contracting institutions since
individuals can respond to contractual distortions by using a variety of for-
mal and informal mechanisms. In the case of this model, agents can respond
via choice of τ s and market size in the face of the τ
κ
g rule, but have only a
limited range of response in the case of the τMg rule.
6.3 Transaction taxes
Policies are sometimes designed to address the negative externalities from
trade (such as trades of a pollutive item), or to raise revenue from a sector
characterized by high-frequency trading (as in a Tobin-type tax). In such
20This welfare ranking is robust to a wide range of different endowment levels (numerical
comparisons over k ∈ (0, 35] all satisfy this ranking). It is also robust to assuming that S
and G are input substitutes.
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policies, individual exchanges are taxed. The European Commission analy-
sis of its proposed Financial Transaction Tax (FTT), for example, finds “in
a nutshell... very positive impacts on the functioning of the single market
for financial instruments” (European Commission, 2013; p.16). The conse-
quences of such a tax are not necessarily obvious, however, since agents may
respond by increasing investment in private exchange cost reduction or may
dramatically change the number of trades. Moreover, the robustness of a
market to the imposition of a tax, i.e., its revenue-generating ability, may
not be fully understood since those markets may shut down or relocate to
avoid the tax.
In order to understand the impact of a transaction tax, we need a frame-
work in which the nature of trade (i.e., the number of exchanges and invest-
ments in the cost of exchange) is endogenous. As such, our model can form a
basis for a preliminary analysis of transaction taxes. We can consider a tax,
t > 0, that simply makes individual exchanges more costly,
α = (1 + t) [1− F (S,G)] k. (21)
Figure 4 demonstrates the effect of a transaction tax where transaction
costs are endogenous (solid line). Agents respond first by increasing invest-
ments in institutions in order to dampen the effect of the tax on the cost
of exchange. Relative to an environment where transaction costs are exoge-
nous (dashed line),21 market size is more robust to the introduction of a
transaction tax. In each environment, agents can avoid the tax by simply
resorting to autarky, recovering the investment in exchange and avoiding all
tax, whenever the participation constraint is no longer satisfied. The impor-
tant difference when transaction costs are endogenous is that agents have
individually allocated a portion of their endowment to support institutions;
in the exogenous case this investment has not occurred and so cannot be
retrieved by agents. That means that although agents intially appear less
affected by the tax, they will opt for autarky at a level of the tax far lower
21The exogenous transaction cost set-up fixes α and the net endowment such that the
equilibrium when t = 0 is the same as that in the endogenous transaction cost environment
(i.e., τg and τs are fixed at the values which are optimal for t = 0).
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than that suggested when transaction costs are considered exogenous.22 The
implication for transaction tax policy is that, while markets respond as would
be expected to the imposition of a tax by reducing market size, agents will
resort to autarky earlier than may expected if the individual agents’ own in-
vestments in that exchange are not taken into account. In case of the FTT,
for example, this may mean that a transaction tax leads to the shifting of
financial activities to geographies outwith the FTT’s jurisdiction at much
lower levels of the tax than may be anticipated. Revenues from such a tax
may fall short of projections.
Figure 4: The effects of a transaction tax
We can again calculate the losses from imposing a tax on transactions.
Figure 5 depicts losses associated with Figure 4. A 5% transaction tax leads
to 3.7% consumption equivalent loss in both the exogenous and endogenous
cases, which is somewhat higher than an equal deviation in the τ g. An
increase in τ g above optimum is at least reducing exchange costs; imposing
a tax on exchange means that, even if agents can respond with higher τ s
and lower market size, the cost of exchange is increasing. In the case where
agents can respond by removing their own investments in reducing exchange
costs, the consumption equivalent loss is capped at 4.9% once the transaction
22With endogenous transaction costs, autarky occurs at 6.6%; if we take them to be
exogenous, the autarky equilibrium is induced at 22.2%. Although these thresholds vary,
this differential impact is robust across the different parameterizations discussed in the
previous subsections.
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tax induces no exchange.
Figure 5: Welfare Costs of Transaction Taxes
7 Discussion and concluding remarks
Economists are increasingly focusing on the role of good institutions in pro-
moting growth, trade and other desiderata. The intention of this paper is to
link in a simple way impediments to transactions, institutional quality and
market size. The efficient equilibrium of the model is consistent with signifi-
cant transaction costs and investments in institutions. A distinction between
transaction costs and exchange costs was made. The impact of distortive in-
stitutions was also considered, although in a tentative and ultimately ad
hoc way. We argued that a number of what might be thought of as ‘good’
institutions are actually sub-optimal when transaction costs are endogenous.
It would seem important to extend the analysis in a number of directions.
First, although agents had different productive capabilities, this had a limited
impact as decisions over τ s and τ g were made before types were revealed. If
decisions over τ s and τ g were made after agents’ productive capabilities were
known (and capabilities are private information) then the analysis will be
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somewhat more complicated. Related to this, incentive compatibility issues
were not to the fore because it was assumed that agents remained in markets
even if, ex post, they might have been better off under autarky. Nevertheless,
the framework developed above may prove useful in the analysis of optimal
tax and the role of government.
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A Proofs of Section 3 propositions
Proposition 2 There is a k > 0 small enough such that optimal market size
is one.
Proof. To the contrary, assume that
Eu
(
[(1− τ s − τ g) k − θα] λ¯
(
ω,Mh
)) ≥ Eu (λik) , (22)
for all k. All variables on the left-hand side reflect optimizing decisions. Note,
in particular, that θ > 1,∀k. Observe that as k → 0, (1− τ s − τ g) − θ(1 −
F (·))→ (1− θ) < 0, and that V¯ is positive for all k > 0. Thus, there exists
a level of k, call it k, such that
lim
k→k
Eu
(
[(1− τ s − τ g) k − θα] λ¯
(
ω,Mh
))→ 0,
As k → k, the inequality in (22) is reversed.
Proposition 3 The optimal policy correspondence contains at most two
plans.
Proof. Let k∗ denote a value of k such that Eu(P1|k∗) = Eu(P3|k∗) = V (k∗).
Assume that there also exists a P2 such that Eu(P1|k∗) = Eu(P2|k∗) =
Eu(P3|k∗). Let
τ 3 > τ 2 > τ 1; θ3 > θ2 > θ1.
Now, denote
θ3 =
x
y
; θ2 =
p
q
; θ1 =
m
n
, (23)
where x, y, p, q,m and n are all positive integers. Define χ as follows:
χ =
p
q
− x
y
m
n
− x
y
.
By assumption p
q
− x
y
< 0, m
n
− x
y
< 0, and p
q
− m
n
< 0, so 1 ≥ χ ≥ 0. Finally,
note that q = p+ 1, n = m+ 1 and y = x+ 1. Thus
p
q
=
[
p(p+ 1)−1 − x(x+ 1)−1
m(m+ 1)−1 − x(x+ 1)−1
]
m
n
+
[
m(m+ 1)−1 − p(p+ 1)−1
m(m+ 1)−1 − x(x+ 1)−1
]
x
y
; (24)
that is, market size associated with P2 is a weighted average of the other two
optimal market sizes. Hence it follows, by the strict concavity of the utility
function, that either: (i) P2 is indeed an optimal plan and P1 and P3 are not;
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or, (ii) P2 is optimal and identical to either P1 or P3; or, (iii) P2 = P1 = P3.
Proposition 4 Let K denote the Borel sets of K ⊂ R++. There exists a
level of k ∈ K, call it k∗, such that
Eu
{
[(1− τ 1) k∗ − θ1α1] λ¯
(
ω,Mh1
)}
= Eu
{
[(1− τ 2) k∗ − θ2α2] λ¯
(
ω,Mh2
)}
where τ 1 6= τ 2, α1 6= α2, Mh1 6= Mh2 and where maximized utility is identical
under both programs.
Proof. Let k ∈ [k, k]. Partition that set into into [k, kˆ) and (kˆ, k] such that
the maxEu(· | ∀k < kˆ) < maxEu(· | ∀k > kˆ), and where τ(k > kˆ) >
τ(k < kˆ), #M(k > kˆ) > #M(k < kˆ). By Proposition 2, such a partition
is possible; it is also implied by (14)–(15). Let {k1} denote any sequence in
[k, kˆ) converging to kˆ and let {k2} be any sequence in (kˆ, k] converging to kˆ.
Let V 1(k1) denote supEu(·|k ∈ [k, kˆ)), V 2(k2) denote supEu(·|k ∈ (kˆ, k])
and Vˆ (kˆ) denote supEu(·|k1 = kˆ). By Proposition 1 these value functions
are well defined and, by the Theorem of the Maximum, continuous. Hence,
there exists a δ such that for
∣∣∣k1 − kˆ∣∣∣ < δ/2 and ∣∣∣k2 − kˆ∣∣∣ < δ/2 one has that,∣∣∣V 1(k1)− Vˆ (kˆ)∣∣∣ < ε/2;∣∣∣V 2(k2)− Vˆ (kˆ)∣∣∣ < ε/2.
Hence ∣∣V 1(k1)− V 2(k2)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣V 1(k1)− Vˆ (kˆ)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣V 2(k2)− Vˆ (kˆ)∣∣∣
≤ ε/2 + ε/2
= ε.
for k1, k2 close to kˆ market size will not be changing. Hence, market size and
taxes are higher for all k ∈ (kˆ, k] compared with k ∈ [k, kˆ). Expected utility
is identical with different optimal plans at k∗ = kˆ.
Following Townsend (1978) and Boyd and Prescott (1985) one may char-
acterize core allocations directly. In the discussion of the efficient equilibrium
in the main text we studied the equilibrium decision rules of an intermediary.
Townsend (1978) labelled that analysis the ”cooperative” solution. Hence,
the equivalence of the core and cooperative solutions is now established,
Proposition 5 in the text.
Proposition 5 The allocations of the cooperative economy coincide with core
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allocations.
Proof. Consider the unique equilibrium: xh = {c∗, y∗, τ ∗,#M∗; i ∈ Mh}
for all h ∈ H. This n-tuple determines F (S∗, G∗) and hence α∗. Suppose a
strict subset of agents in the market intermediated by h, B ⊂Mh, can form
a blocking coalition (i.e., market). The cooperative equilibrium necessitates
that the blocking coalition cannot deviate from contributing τ ∗g on average.
The blocking intermediary chooses τBs given the market size #B < #M
h.
The agents in the blocking coalitions are better off with the following pro-
gram:
ci = c¯, τ ig = τ
∗
g, ∀i ∈ B;
1 = 2
(
#B − 1
#B
)
kFS
(
SB, G∗
)
.
The consumption profile follows from optimizing over agents with identical,
strictly concave utility functions and the second condition was derived in the
text. By Remark 1, SB-capital is strictly lower and exchange costs strictly
higher. There are fewer transactions in this proposed market but each is more
costly. In addition, the investment portfolio is less diversified. Given that
market size and investment in S-capital deviate from the optimum, it must
be that the higher exchange cost and less diversification are not compensated
by fewer transactions; expected utility is necessarily lower. Now consider the
case B ⊃M. The same argument applies: In this proposed market, exchange
costs are strictly lower and investments higher. The deviation from first-best
means that expected utility must be lower than in market M . Hence, the
cooperative allocation is in the core. Further, since the core is non-empty and
#M is the unique optimal market size, it follows that the core allocations
and the allocations of the cooperative economy coincide.
B Proofs of Section 4 propositions
Proposition 6 In the core, voluntary allocations to general capital are zero.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium in which τ ig = 0 ∀ i ∈ I, so that G = 0.
By Proposition 2, for k big enough, there is a positive level of S-capital that
is optimal, τ is = τ
∗∗
s , ∀ i ∈ I; EU i = EU0 denotes expected utility under
this plan. Suppose a blocking coalition B exists such that an agent b ∈ B
proposes τ bg > 0 for i ∈ B. If #B < ℵ0, then G = 0 obtains and it follows
that EU i < EU0 for all i ∈ B. Suppose, however that #B = ℵ0 and that
an agent b ∈ B proposes τ bg > 0 for i ∈ B. In that case G = Gb > 0. Since
#B > 0, some positive level of G is optimal, and so EU i > EU0 for each
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i ∈ B. But now there exists a blocking coalition B′ ⊂ B in which some agent
b′ ∈ B′ proposes τ b′g = 0 for each i ∈ B′. Since #B′ < ℵ0 it remains the case
that G = Gb. Therefore, EU i (for i ∈ B′) must be greater than EU i (for
i ∈ B). So while there can exist blocking coalitions which propose τ bg > 0 for
some i ∈ B, they are not in the core; ‘voluntary’ contributions to G-capital
are zero.
Proposition 7 If any agent may propose an enforceable tax plan then all
agents will be taxed according to (15). It follows that G = G∗.
Proof. Suppose that a group of agents V ⊆ I each seek a mandate for their
proposals. Let G = τ gk. The proposalMg = {{τ ig}i∈I |G ≤ G} of each agent
g ∈ V includes taxation levels for each agent i ∈ I as well as a proposed level
of G-capital, G ≤ G. Agent i votes for the tax plan that will provide her
with the highest expected utility; EU i|g′ is the expected utility to agent i if
agent g′ holds the mandate to tax. V g
′
denotes the set of agents who vote
for the tac plan of agent g′. So, if #V g
′
> #V g
′′
for every g′′ ∈ V\g′, then
agent g′ holds the mandate to tax, imposes taxation levels and delivers the
level of G-capital in return. In the core, all agents are taxed equally and no
rents accrue: G = G. Consider the alternative to this. If an agent g′ ∈ V
offers a tax plan Mg′ = {{τ ig′ = τ ′g}i∈I |G ′} in which τ ′gk > G ′ there is some
other agent g′′ ∈ V who offers a plan Mg′′ = {{τ ig′′ = τ ′g}i∈I |G ′′} in which
τ ′gk > G ′′ > G ′ which delivers #V g′′ > #V g′ . Given free entry to proposing a
tax plan, the rent from holding the mandate is driven to zero, so that agent
g∗, who sets τ ∗g to satisfy (15), ensures that G = G = G∗.
C Proof of proposition 8
The equivalence of core and competitive equilibria is established by extending
the arguments of Townsend (1978). First, some notation is developed. Let
any agent h ∈ I propose strategy P h for intermediating in a market. This
strategy has eight components: Mh is the market proposed by agent h; P h1
is the yield in terms of the consumption good of one share in the portfolio
of agent h; P h2 is the price in terms of the capital good at which agent h is
willing to buy an unlimited number of shares in the goods production of any
agent in Mh; P h3 is a fixed fee in terms of the capital good for the purchase
of shares in the portfolio of agent h by i ∈ Mh; P h4 is the price in terms of
the capital good at which agent h is willing to sell an unlimited number of
shares in her portfolio to agents in Mh; τhs is the proportion of the capital
endowment that agent h proposes to invest in S-capital for that market; τhg
is similarly defined. Recall that with free political entry agent g∗ delivers on
the manifesto promise and ensures that G = G. Finally, αh (F ) is the ex post
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exchange cost. It is not strictly necessary to include αh (F ) in the definition
of the strategy space but it aids intuition to do so. In what follows, QihD is the
quantity of shares purchased by i in h’s portfolio, whilst QhiS is the quantity of
shares sold by i to h. Aih is a switching function, where Aih = 1 if agent i buys
shares in the portfolio of intermediary h, and Aih = 0 otherwise. One may
characterize the optimal strategies for intermediaries and non-intermediaries
for a given market size. The following unconstrained optimization delivers
the supporting price vector. Finally, we reduce on notation by writing x
when we really mean x(ω).
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a set of actions
{
QijS∗, Q
ji
D∗, A
ij
∗
}
and a strategy P i∗ =
{
M i∗, P
i
1∗, P
i
2∗, P
i
3∗, P
i
4∗, τ
i
s∗, τ
i
g∗, α
i
∗(F )
}
for each agent
i ∈ I (where for any variable x, the convention xii = 0 is adopted), an
allocation {ci∗, yi∗; i ∈ I} and a set of markets which satisfy:
1. If agent i is not an intermediary (QjiD∗ = 0,∀j ∈ I) then
{
yi∗, Q
ij
S∗, Q
ji
D∗, A
ih
∗ , τ
hi
s∗, τ
hi
g∗, α
hi
∗ (F )
}
maximizes (25) subject to (26), (27) and (28) and P h = P h∗ ∀h 6= i. ci∗
is given by (27), and given (30)− (33).
2. Agents participate in, at most, one market, M . In each market there is
one intermediary such that h ∈ M, Mh∗ = M, and
{
τ ihs , τ
ih
g , α
ih(F )
}
={
τ ihs∗, τ
ih
g∗, α
ih
∗ (F )
}
. For each i ∈M\h, Aih = 1. For every such h, P h is
feasible, with yh chosen to maximize (29) subject to (30) and (31). ch∗
is given by (31).
3. There exist no blocking strategies for any agent of I.
Hence, a non-intermediary faces the following problem:
max
QihD ,Q
hi
S ,y
i,Aih
∑
h:i∈Mh
[
Aih
] [
EU
(
QihDP
h
1 + y
iλi −QhiS λi
)]
, (25)
subject to the following constraints regarding feasibility and participation,[ ∑
h:i∈Mh
(
Aih
) (
(1− τhs − τhg)ki +QhiS P h2 −QihDP h4 − P h3 − α(F h)− yi
)] ≥ 0;
(26)
ci(ω) =
[ ∑
h:i∈Mh
(
Aih
) (
QihDP
h
1 (ω) + y
iλi(ω)−QhiS λi(ω)
)] ≥ 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω;
(27)
Aih = 1⇒ Aij = 0, ∀i such that i ∈M j,∀j 6= h. (28)
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An intermediary chooses a strategy to maximize,
maxEU
(
yhλh +
∑
i∈Mh
[
QhiS λ
i −QihDP h1
])
, (29)
subject to,[
(1− τhs − τhg)kh − α(F h) (#M − 1)− yh +
∑
i∈Mh
[
QihDP
h
4 + P
h
3 −QhiS P h2
]] ≥ 0;
(30)
ch(ω) =
[∑
i∈Mh
[
QhiS λ
i(ω)−QihDP h1 (ω)
]
+ yhλh(ω)
]
≥ 0,∀ω ∈ Ω; (31)
and the following relations:
G ≤ τ gk; (32)
Sh ≤ τ sk; (33)
αh =
[
1− F (Sh, G)] k; (34)∑
i∈Mh
P h3 − α (#M − 1) = −2α
(#M − 1)
#M
. (35)
Equation (35) may be regarded as the free-entry constraint upon the equi-
librium intermediary strategy.
Proposition 9 If there exists a competitive equilibrium, with political free-
entry as defined above, then the equilibrium is in the core.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium, for a given endowment k, for which a block-
ing coalition exists. Further, assume that this blocking coalition, denoted
#B, is a market in which transaction costs, production and consumption
are Pareto optimal. In such an equilibrium, consumption is equalized across
all agents in the blocking coalition: y = (1− τ s − τ g) k −
(
#Bb−1
#Bb
)
2αb and
cb = c¯,∀i ∈ B; EU(cb) > EU(ch), h 6= b. For some agent b ∈ B, the following
are necessary conditions for an optimal strategy:
U ′(·)
∑
i∈Bb
λi + φb (#M)P b2 + µ
b
∑
i∈Bb
λi = 0; (36)
−U ′(·) (#B)P b1 − φb (#B)P b4 − µb (#B)P b1 = 0; (37)
U ′(·)λb + φb + µbλb = 0; (38)
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φbk−φbF ′(Sb,G)(#B−1)k2−ηbF ′(Sb,G)(#B−1)k2+2ηbF ′(Sb,G)k2 (#B − 1)
#B
= 0,
(39)
where φb, µb, ηb, are unknown multipliers on constraints (30), (31) and (35),
respectively. For non-intermediaries, necessary conditions for an optimum
are,
U ′(·)λi + φ+ µλi = 0; (40)
−U ′(·)λi − P b2φ− µλi = 0; (41)
U ′(·)P b1 + φP b4 + µP b1 = 0, (42)
where φ and µ are multipliers on constraints (26) and (27), respectively.
Equations (40) and (41) together imply that P b2 = 1, and so it follows that
P b4 = 1. Use these in the intermediary’s first-order conditions:
P b1 = −
φB
U ′(·) + µB , (43)
and,
U ′(·) = −φ
h (#B)P b2∑
i∈Bb
λi
− µb. (44)
Therefore,
P b1 =
(
1
#B
)∑
i∈Bb
λi. (45)
Finally, we have,
P b3 = [1− F (Sb,G)]k
(#B − 2)
#B
. (46)
Since they are the shadow prices of dual constraints, it follows φb = −ηb, so
then (39) implies,
1 = 2F ′S(S
b,G)k (#B − 1)
#B
. (47)
Equation (47) determines the unique optimal, τ#Bs , for a given market size,
#B. Finally, the agent who decides on general capital investment will choose
1 = 2F ′G(S
b, G)k
(#B − 1)
#B
. (48)
If this agent is a non-intermediary this follows from 0 = φk+φ
∂P b3
∂τg
+φ ∂α
∂τg
; if
the agent is an intermediary, it follows from the analogue to equation (39).
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Consider, a political manifesto that proposes a τ g greater or less than that
proposed by (46). Since, the ECT is strictly concave, as is the utility function,
a tax rate exists such that the tax burden is no higher, but exchange costs
are lower. That is, consumption is strictly higher. However, an equilibrium
outcome has been constructed that is consistent with efficient, optimizing
behavior (across intermediaries and non-intermediaries), that is nevertheless
inconsistent with property 3 in the definition of equilibrium.
Proposition 10 All core allocations can be supported as equilibria.
Proof. Assume that the optimal market size is greater than unity and less
than infinity. Then the above first-order conditions can be used directly
to construct an equilibrium that is a competitive equilibrium (since core
and competitive equilibria coincide). Since the optimal market size exists,
one may construct equilibrium markets. Hence, Properties 1 and 2 of the
definition of equilibrium are met. Finally, no set of agents will block this
allocation since it would be unable to attain a higher level of utility than
under the cooperative equilibrium.
D Comparative Static Results
Remark 1 shows that market size and ECT allocations increase in #M .
Propositions 3 and 4 demonstrates that there may exist a k∗ at which two
(and no more than two) plans are optimal. It remains to characterize the
relationship between k and transaction costs in between the k∗ at which the
optimal market size changes.
Proposition 11 For a given market size greater than one, (i) transaction
costs are strictly decreasing in k; and (ii) if FS and FG are inelastic with
respect to S and G respectively, optimal investments in ECT rise unambigu-
ously in k.
Proof. Transaction costs: Recall κ = (k − y) /k = τ s+τ g+2
(
#M−1
#M
)
(1− F ).
Thus,
∂κ
∂k
=
∂τ s
∂k
+
∂τ g
∂k
− θ
[
∂F
∂S
(
k
∂τ s
∂k
+ τ s
)
+
∂F
∂G
(
k
∂τ g
∂k
+ τ g
)]
;
= −
(
θk
∂F
∂S
− 1
)
∂τ s
∂k
−
(
θk
∂F
∂G
− 1
)
∂τ g
∂k
− θ
(
τ s
∂F
∂S
+ τ g
∂F
∂G
)
,
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where θ = 2
(
#M−1
#M
)
. And using the optimality conditions,
∂κ
∂k
= −(τ s + τ g)/k < 0. (49)
ECT investment: Throughout, it is assumed that FSG = FGS > 0; this is
consistent with the view that specific and general capital investments are
positively correlated. (14) and (15) together imply,{
FSS (S,G)
[
τ s +
∂τ s
∂k
k
]
+ FSG (S,G)
[
τ g +
∂τ g
∂k
k
]}
k + FS (S,G) = 0; (50){
FGG (S,G)
[
τ g +
∂τ g
∂k
k
]
+ FGS (S,G)
[
τ s +
∂τ s
∂k
k
]}
k + FG (S,G) = 0. (51)
It should be recalled that we are characterizing optimal outcomes for a given
#M . From equation (51) it follows that ∂τg
∂k
k+τ g = − FGkFGG−
FSG
kFGG
(
τ s +
∂τs
∂k
k
)
,
and combining with (50), one recovers an expression for the elasticity of τ s
with respect to k:
∂τ s
∂k
k
τ s
=
FGFSG − FSFGG
τ sk
[
FSSFGG − (FSG)2
] − 1. (52)
Equation (52) allows one to check the sign of the elasticity; τ sk
[
FSSFGG − (FSG)2
]
is positive by the assumption of strict concavity and FGFSG−FSFGG is posi-
tive since FG, FSG, FS > 0 and FGG < 0. As such, for
∂τs
∂k
k
τs
> 0, one requires
that FSG (FG + τ skFSG) > FGG (FS + τ skFSS). The left hand side is posi-
tive; a sufficient condition then is that the right hand side is negative. This
requires that FS is inelastic with respect to S, i.e., that−SFSSFS < 1. Assum-
ing the equivalent condition holds for general capital, optimal investments in
general and specific capital are, for a given market size, strictly increasing in
the level of the endowment.
E Numerical solution to the model
First, the choice of functional form for the ECT and utility function is dis-
cussed, as is the modelling of consumption-good productivity. Next, the
solution of the model is explained and analyzed holding fixed the level of the
endowment. The solution of the model is then studied when k varies. Finally,
the robustness of the analysis to the risk aversion and ECT parameters is
examined.
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E.1 A numerically tractable model
Consider a general CES form for the ECT,
F (S,G) = [δFs (S)
σ + (1− δ)Fg (G)σ]1/σ ,
where δ ∈ (0, 1) and 1/ (1− σ) is the constant elasticity of substitution.
Functions Fx (x = s, x = g) are continuous, decreasing and strictly concave
in their only argument; in particular, F ′x > 0, F
′′
x < 0 and Fx(0) = 0,
Fx (y) → 1 as y → ∞, F ′x(y) → 0 as y → ∞ and F ′x(0) = ∞ for x ∈ {s, g}.
Fg and Fs need not be identical functions. Thus,
Fs = [1− exp (−βτ sk)]γs ;
Fg = [1− exp (−βτ gk)]γg ,
where γs need not be equal to γg and where β, γs, γg ∈ (0, 1). These functions
and parametric restrictions have a number of useful properties that both
satisfy the restrictions on the ECT and facilitate numerical analysis. Taking
the first partial of Fs with respect to τ s one obtains,
F ′s = βkγs exp (−βτ sk) [1− exp (−βτ sk)]γs−1
The Inada-type requirements are readily confirmed. In addition, the pa-
rameters β, γs, γg ∈ (0, 1) allow one to vary the effectiveness of the ECT.23
one may use the parameters γs, γg to make distinctions between the relative
efficiency of specific and general investments to exchange cost alleviation.
Agents have identical CRRA utility, U (x) = [x1−γ − 1] / (1− γ) with γ >
0 being the coefficient of relative risk aversion. For numerical tractability, we
specialize to a two-state case in which production technologies are restricted
to Λ = {λ1, λ2} where λ1 < λ2 and p(λ1) = ρ and p(λ2) = 1− ρ.
The expected average technology for a market of size #M is given by the
following expression
E
[
λ¯#M
]
=
#M∑
i=0
{(
#M
i
)
ρ#M−i(1− ρ)i [(#M − i)λ1 + iλ2]
}
/#M, (53)
which is invariant to #M . One may now state the problem:
Γ = arg max
#M
#M∑
i=0
(
#M
i
)
ρ#M−i(1−ρ)iU
[ {
(1− τ s − τ g) k − (2α)(#M−1)#M
}
×
× [(#M − i)λ1 + iλ2] /#M
]
23We use MATLAB to compute equilibria. MATLAB code and simulation output is
available from the authors.
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subject to
2
(
#M − 1
#M
)
[δ [1− exp (−βτ sk)]γsσ + (1− δ) [1− exp (−βτ gk)]γgσ]
1−σ
σ ×
× δβkγs exp (−βτ sk) [1− exp (−βτ sk)]γsσ−1 = 1,
2
(
#M − 1
#M
)
{δ [1− exp (−βτ sk)]γsσ + (1− δ) [1− exp (−βτ gk)]γgσ}
1−σ
σ ×
× (1− δ) βkγg exp (−βτ gk) [1− exp (−βτ gk)]γgσ−1 = 1,
where α =
{
1− [δ [1− exp (−βτ sk)]γsσ + (1− δ) [1− exp (−βτ gk)]γgσ]1/σ
}
k
and max {Γ} is selected as the unique solution. The two constraints to solve
simultaneously for the optimal τ ∗ =
{
τ ∗s, τ
∗
g
}
.
E.2 ECT, diversification and utility with a fixed en-
dowment
Table 2 gives the parameter values in the baseline case.
Table 2: Baseline Calibration for Endogenous Exchange Costs
endowment k 25
coefficient of relative risk aversion γ 3
specific ECT curvature γs 0.065
general ECT curvature γg 0.085
ECT factor β 0.03
weight on specific ECT δ 0.5
CES coefficient s, 1− 1
s
= σ 0.5
low technology λ1 1
high technology λ2 5
probability of low technology ρ 0.5
The baseline case supposes a difference in the effectiveness of S-capital
and G-capital; γg > γs and so G-capital is the less efficient.
First the effect on optimal market size and expected utility of different
levels of ECT investment is examined. Agents choose how far (if at all)
to diversify given their residual endowment and exchange costs. Figure 6
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displays expected utility solving at optimal market size over a grid of {τ s, τ g};
figure 7 gives choices of market size.
Figures 6 and 7 make clear that over some combinations of the {τ s, τ g}
pairs, expected utility from diversification is higher than from not diversi-
fying. There is a peak in expected utility at some unique combination of
τ s and τ g. Clearly, market size does not peak at the peak of expected util-
ity: Sub-optimal institutions can induce larger markets, as was explored in
Section 6.
E.3 ECT, diversification and utility with a varying en-
dowment
Using the parameter values given in Table 2, k is permitted to vary. The so-
lution algorithm evaluates
{
τ ∗s, τ
∗
g
}
using the marginal conditions for market
sizes up to some #Mˆ > 1 and selects the diversification level that maxi-
mizes expected utility (increasing #Mˆ as required when #Mˆ is the utility
maximizing choice). Figure 1 gives results for these simulations.
E.4 Robustness to risk aversion and ECT parameters
There are computational limitations to numerical analysis of the model.
MATLAB v.7, for example, will only calculate up to 170!. As can be seen in
the bottom-left panel of Figure 1, this will quickly become a limiting prob-
lem. However, one can see the effect of changes in some other parameters.
Figures 8 and 9 give results under different parameterizations of risk aversion
and ECT efficiency. In each, the central case (i.e., the middle line) reflects
the parameterization in Table 2. Variations on the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, γ, and on the ECT, β, are Table 2 values multiplied by 1± 1
6
.
Figure 8 shows some variation in optimal behavior in regard to risk aver-
sion. For a given endowment, the optimal market size is decreasing in risk
aversion. Further, agents are willing to spend more on diversification (i.e.,
forming markets), as can be seen by the size of transaction costs in each
case. Figure 9 demonstrates the effect of varying the coefficient on the ECT.
Reducing β means that agents diversify at lower endowments. The size of
transaction costs is lower for a given endowment, but relatively unchanged
for a given market size. The effect of changing the exchange technology is
primarily to make it feasible for agents to diversify with a lower endowment:
The nature of that diversification is little affected.
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E.5 Distortive institutions and the transaction tax
For distortive institutions, the algorithm is a simple extension of that de-
scribed above: One uses the marginal condition to find τ ∗s for a grid of τ g
and identify the τ g which obtains the two rules of thumb. For the transaction
tax, the value for t is introduced to the expression for α and agents optimize
over investments and market size taking t as given.
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F Figures
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Figure 6: Expected Utility and ECT Investment
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Figure 7: Optimal Market Size and ECT Investment
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Figure 8: Risk Aversion and Endogenous Exchange
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Figure 9: ECT Calibration and Endogenous Exchange
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